Lecture 2: Political Philosophy of the Welfare State

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Introduction

• Political Philosophy of the Welfare State

- Philosophical or political views influence the views on the welfare state
- Theories of society offer principles that enable to choose between different social arrangements

• Economics of the Welfare State

- Theoretical and empirical economic analysis largely influenced by welfarism
- One needs to clarify arguments of the debate that rely on moral or philosophical grounds from those that rely on empirical or theoretical analyses

Lecture outline

I. Normative approach

Welfarism vs non-welfarism
 Utilitarism

II. Theories of social justice

- 1 Libertarian theories of social justice
- 2 Liberal theories of social justice
- 3 Collectivist theories of social justice

III. How to account for social preferences?

- 1 Social welfare functions
- 2 Survey about social preferences

I. What is a normative approach?

Normative views

- Normative views represent value judgement
- Economics is agnostic on these views

• The structure of arguments

 Normative analysis does not answer the question "what ought the government do?" but "what ought the government do given a particular objective?" It aims "to illuminate the relationship between objectives and conclusions" (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, p. 334)

Objectives/instruments

- Objectives are given by moral philosophy and democracy
- Instruments are given by practical or political feasibility

What is a normative approach?

- Value judgments are inescapable
 - Economics is not a value-neutral science "Economics is a moral science" (Atkinson, 2009)
 - · Policy advices rely on welfare judgments, hence on welfare criteria

• Welfare economics

- Welfare economics prominent in the 1950s and 1960s : Pigou, Kaldor, Samuelson, Baumol, etc.
- "Strange disappearance" (Atkinson, 2001)
- Re-engaging with political philosophy
 - Classical economics in 18th c. considered as part of political philosophy (e.g., Adam Smith)
 - Need to be explicit about moral philosophy underpinning welfare judgments (Sandel, 2013)

Welfarism

• Welfarist approach

- Social welfare depends only on individual's utility or well-being $u_i(x)$ and nothing else.
- Bergson-Samuelson welfare function (Bergson, 1938)

$$SW(x) = W(u_1(x), ..., u_n(x))$$

- Welfarism is a form of *consequentialism*
- Non-welfarist approach (deontology)
 - Morality of an action should be based on whether that action itself is right or wrong under a series of rules and principles, rather than based on the consequences of the action (e.g., Kant)
 - Certain principles (liberty, equality, etc.) are above their potential welfare impact

Utilitarianism



Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)

English moral philosopher, founder of University College London (UCL) and utilitarianism

The right policy should maximise "the greatest good for the greatest number of people" Utility is whatever produces pleasure or happiness

Utilitarianism is a form of welfarism

- No account of income distribution
- Close to maximizing GDP (adjusting for labour supply)

Issues with utilitarism

1 No respect for fundamental human rights?

- Can the majority derives utility in exploiting the minority?
 - e.g., banning religious minority
 - e.g., enjoying killing slaves/criminals
- Can utility for the many justify anything?
 - e.g., torturing terrorists' children

2 Can you measure utility?

- Income is not utility
 - $e.g.,\ consumption,\ disutility\ of\ hours\ of\ work$
- Other non-monetary elements of well-being
 - e.g., health, inequality, environment, friendship, etc.

Utilitarianism revised



John Stuart Mill (1806–1873)

English philosopher, political economist, politician and civil servant.

Liberal MP, defence of liberty, individualism, freedom of speech, women's rights.

On Liberty (1859), Utilitarianism (1861)

In defense of utilitarianism

- Maximizing utility over the long run implies protecting individual freedom
- Higher pleasures are more desirable from lower ones

Debate around welfarism

- Utilitarianism as a threat to liberty
 - "The impossibility of a Paretian liberal" (Sen, JPE 1970)
 - if people have views about other people's action, then individual freedom may not be compatible with utilitarianism
 - e.g., policies about personal appearance, sexual behaviour
 - Risk of tyranny of majority
 - Need to complement with other non welfarist principles : liberty, human rights (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1986)

• Does non-welfarism violates the Pareto principle?

- Non-welfarism imply making sometimes everyone worse off (Kaplow and Shavell, JPE 2001)
- See critical comment (Fleurbaey et al., JPE 2003)

Markets and social justice

• What money can't buy

• Use of welfarism leads to the application of market solutions to a wider range of moral problems (Sandel, 2012; Besley, 2013; Sandel, 2013)

e.g., paying to skip the queue

Issues

Every transaction does not always reflect voluntary exchange

e.g., poverty induced prostitution, kidney selling, etc.

- 2 Market solution can induce corruption of activity
 - e.g., paying kids for good grades can reduce the self-interest in education
- 3 Crowding out of social norms
 - e.g., fee for being late at child care (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000)

Perspectives around welfarism

• Welfare is a broad notion

- Welfare is a broad and subjective notion
- Rawls' liberties or Sen's capabilities should be part of welfare
- Indirect effects of market solutions should also be part of welfare

• Practical vs theoretical level (Kaplow, 2008)

- Welfare is hard to measure
- · Horizontal equity or due process are good guides for well-being

II. Theories of social justice

- 1 Libertarian theories of social justice
- 2 Liberal theories of social justice
- 3 Collectivist theories of social justice

Libertarian theories of social justice

• Main principles

- Primacy of individual freedom
- Defense of private property
- Laissez-faire, opponents to state intervention

• Two strands of libertarians

- Natural-rights libertarians : state intervention is morally wrong
- 2 Empirical libertarians : state intervention reduces total welfare

Natural-rights Libertarians

• Liberty and self-ownership

- Right to do what we want with what we own, provided we respect other people's right
- Individuals own their labour, their wealth, their body

e.g., right to buy/sell sex (if consensual)

e.g., right not to fasten seat belt

• Justice as a process

- Justice is defined as the process that generate an income distribution
- It requires also justice in the initial endowments

• Main references

- Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)

Natural-rights Libertarians : policies

- The night-watchman State
 - "a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts" (Nozick, 1974, p. ix)
- Welfare state is anathema
 - The pursuit of equality is immoral and a violation of individual liberty
 - Taxation is akin to theft, forced labour or slavery
 - Governments can carry out only unanimously approved activities (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962)
- Reparations for past wrongs
 - Inherited wealth could be the result of past injustice
 - e.g., wealth of descendants from slave owners
 - Libertarian case for reparations

Empirical Libertarians

• Principles

- 1 Primacy of individual freedom
- **2** Value of market mechanisms
- **3** Pursuit of social justice is harmful

• Very limited welfare state

- Function of government is "to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to foster competitive markets" (Friedman, 1962)
- Government interventions is fraught with danger, but depends on cost and benefit analysis
- Limited welfare state is acceptable to fund public goods and relieve destitution

Main references

- Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960)
- Milton Friedman, Capitalisme and Freedom (1962)

Liberal theories of social justice

• Principles

- 1 Societies analysed in terms of individuals
- 2 Private property and markets are means towards policy goals (not ends)
- 3 Objectives of equity and social justice

• Strong defence of the welfare state

- Market system is the most efficient to produce goods and services, but creates poverty and inequality
- State intervention should reduce poverty and inequality
- Guaranteeing income security is a necessary condition to individual freedom

Main references

- Philosophy : Bentham, Sawls, Sen
- Policy advocates : Beveridge, Keynes



John Rawls (1921-2002)

American moral and political philosopher A figure of Liberalism in the contract theory tradition

A Theory of Justice (1971)

• Social contract tradition : Rousseau, Hobbes, Grotius, Locke, Kant

- Individuals are "free, equal, and independent"
- They leave the state of nature where force prevail
- They agree by mutual consent to be ruled by state of law

• John Rawls A Theory of Justice (1971)

• Choice "behind the veil of ignorance"

- Need to make social choice free of current status (money, power, intelligence, etc.)
- Hypothetical agreement in an initial situation of equality

• Two principles of justice

- (i) "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others"
- (ii) "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society" (maximin)

• Non-welfarist approach

- Principle i) is non welfarist : basic liberty cannot be put into question by utility maximisation
- Principle ii) is welfarist with equality objectives

• Human rights and Rawlsian maximin

• Article 1 of Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (1789) : "Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits. Les distinctions sociales ne peuvent être fondées que sur l'utilité commune"

[Trad. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions can only be based upon common utility]

• Sentence 2 can be interpreted as Rawlsian maximin

• Is Rawlsian justice meritocratic?

- Meritocracy defends a fair equality of opportunity (not only formal equality)
- Rawls rejects meritocracy as it "still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents"

• Difference principle

- Outcomes from the natural talents should be shared by the community
- Differences in situations should be allowed only if they benefit the least fortunate

"Those who have been favored by nature, whoever, they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation for those who have lost out."

Critique of Maximin principle

• Harsanyi (APSR, 1975)

- maximin makes no sense : it could require us to sacrifice everything we have, just to improve slightly the well being of a small group of handicapped or mentally retarded or incurable individuals
- utilitarianism makes more sense

• Interesting, but :

- (i) Harsanyi ignores Rawls' first principle (basic rights and opportunities), in spite of the fact that his exemples involve substantial rights and opportunities (handicap, health), rather than abstract monetary redistribution
- (ii) Harsanyi does not tell us how we can agree about a concavity parameter for utilitarian social welfare function

Sen's capabilities



Amartya Sen

Indian economist, Nobel Prize 1998 Commodities and capabilities (1985) On Economic Inequality (1997) Development as Freedom (1999)

- Capabilities and functionings
 - Functionings (cf. $\epsilon\rho\gamma\sigma\nu$ of Aristotle) are the functions of an human being e.g., nourishment, shelter, physical mobility, ability to take part in the life of the community, etc.
 - Capabilities are the substantive freedom to achieve different functionings, i.e., the capability set

Equality of opportunity



John E. Roemer American economist and political scientist (Prof. Yale University) Equality of opportunity (1998) Theories of distributive justice (1996)

• Equality of opportunity

- Equality of opportunity is seeking to offset differences in outcomes attributable to luck, but not those differences in outcomes for which individuals are responsible
- "leveling the playing field" or "luck egalitarianism"
- Non-welfarist approach : social welfare does not depend only on individual utilities, on outcomes that depend in part from luck

Egalitarianism

• Specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970)

- Some goods necessary for life and citizenship should be provided with strict equality
 - e.g., access to justice, vote, food in war time, etc.
- Or minimum provision should be guaranteed
 - e.g., education, health, housing, etc.

• The rights-based approach

• most appropriate to account for the historical rise of the social state e.g., access to free education, to free health care, etc.

• Absolute limits to inequalities

- Necessary limits to wealth and poverty for avoiding civil disintegration (Plato, Laws, V)
- Debate about absolute distance

e.g., ratio 4:1 (Plato); CEO to average worker's pay

Democratic socialists

• Main principles

- Primacy to equality (along needs and rights)
- Freedom is essential. Freedom of choice only possible without poverty or substantial inequality)
- Fraternity is a defining value : cooperation and altruism rather than competition and self-interest

• Criticism of the free market

- Free market is seen as undemocratic (power to a small elite)
- Free market is seen as unjust (rewards not related to merit or need)

• Support for the welfare state

• Welfare state is a step towards socialism

Marxism

• Main principles

- It is the capitalist mode of production which creates inequalities and social class struggles
- Exploitation of labour by capitalists because wage set at subsistence level
- Policy is primary concerned by public ownership of production means

• Ambiguous view about the welfare state

- An instrument of capitalist oppression?
- Or a progressive outcome of working-class pressure?

III. How to account for social preferences?

- 1 Social welfare functions
- 2 Generalised social marginal welfare weights
- **3** Survey about social preferences

- Definition
 - A *SWF*(*x*) provides the complete description of the evaluation of all social states or policies *x*
 - Social planner maximizes SWF(x) by selecting optimal policy x
- Utilitarian SWF
 - Social welfare SW according to Bentham would be :

$$SWF(x) = \sum_{i}^{n} u_i(x)$$

- Maximin SWF
 - The maximin principle maximizes the welfare of the least advantaged :

$$SWF(x) = \min_i u_i(x)$$

• General SWF

• Concave transformation of utility $V(u_i)$ determines collective preference for redistribution

$$SWF(x) = \sum_{i}^{n} V(u_i(x))$$

• Preference for equality parameter γ

$$SWF(x) = \sum_{i}^{n} rac{u_i(x)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

- $\gamma >=$ 0 represents a preference for equality
- $\gamma = \mathbf{0}$: utilitarian case
- $\gamma = \infty$: Rawlsian maximin

- Concavity of utility u(x)
 - Maximization of expected utility "behind the veil of ignorance" (Vickrey, 1945; Harsanyi, 1953)
 - More risk-averse individuals will prefer more redistribution (concavity of *u*)

$$u(c)=rac{1}{1-
ho}c^{1-
ho}$$
 with $ho
eq 1$


 ρ is here the coefficient of relative risk aversion

• Adding incentive costs to redistribution

- Without incentive costs (i.e., fixed output), then total equality is always optimal if $\varepsilon > 0$
- With incentive costs, then total equality is generally not optimal even if $\varepsilon=+\infty$

• Range of SWF (Kaplow 2008)

- E, egalitarianism
- R, rawlsian maximin
- U, utilitarian
- L, libertarian
- X, concentration of wealth into the hands of the ruler



Generalised social marginal welfare weights

• Saez and Stantcheva (AER, 2016)

- Replace social welfare weights by generalized social marginal welfare weights g_i
- There is no social welfare objective primitive that the government maximizes
- g_i measures social value of \$1 transfer for person i
- Specified to directly capture fairness criteria
- Characteristics in utility vs in welfare weights

•
$$g_i = g(c_i, z_i; x_i^s, x_i^b)$$
, and $u_i = u(c_i - v(z_i; x_i^b; x_i^u))$

- c_i is consumption, z_i pre-tax income
- x_i^s is a set of characteristics which enters the welfare weights but not utility (e.g., family background)
- x_i^b is a set of characteristics which enters utility and welfare weights (e.g., ability to earn)
- x_i^u is a set of characteristics which enters utility but not deemed fair to compensate for (e.g., taste for work)

Application to welfarist and non-welfarist cases

• Utilitarianism

- $g_i = \tilde{g}(c_i)$ with \tilde{g} decreasing
- There is more weight given to those with lower consumption level (decreasing marginal utility)
- Libertarianism
 - $g_i = \tilde{g}(c_i z_i)$ with \tilde{g} increasing
 - There is more weight given to how much taxes is paid

• Deserving poor vs free-loaders

- Distinguish between those who can't work and the free loaders $(g_i = 0)$
- Behavioral response desirability of transfers to the bottom

• Equality of opportunity

• Justification for social welfare weights decreasing with income not due to decreasing marginal utility (utilitarianism)

- Saez and Stantcheva (AER Online Appendix, 2016)
 - Online survey of 1100 Americans (via Amazon MTurk)
 - Asking hypothetical questions to elicit social preferences
 - People typically do not have a "utilitarian" social justice principles : some aspects of non-welfarist preferences

• Main results

- 1 Consumption lovers not seen as more deserving than frugal persons
- 2 People put weight on whether income has been earned through effort vs. not
- 3 People put weight of what people would have done absent the government intervention (deserving poor vs. free loaders)
- 4 People put weight on taxes paid conditional on consumption

• Consumption lovers vs frugal persons

Which of the following two individuals do you think is most deserving of a \$1,000 tax break?

Individual A earns \$50,000 per year, pays \$10,000 in taxes and hence nets out \$40,000. She greatly enjoys spending money, going out to expensive restaurants, or traveling to fancy destinations. She always feels that she has too little money to spend.

Individual B earns the same amount, \$50,000 per year, also pays \$10,000 in taxes and hence also nets out \$40,000. However, she is a very frugal person who feels that her current income is sufficient to satisfy her needs.

Individual A is most deserving of the \$1,000 tax break

Individual B is most deserving of the \$1,000 tax break

Both individuals are exactly equally deserving of the tax \$1,000 break

- 4% consider consumption lovers (A) more deserving
- 22% consider more frugal (B) more deserving
- 74% consider taste for consumption irrelevant

Hard working vs leisure lover

Which of the following two individuals is most deserving of a \$1,000 tax break?

Individual A earns \$30,000 per year, by working in two different jobs, 60 hours per week at \$10/hour. She pays \$6,000 in taxes and nets out \$24,000. She is very hard-working but she does not have high-paying jobs so that her wage is low.

Individual B also earns the same amount, \$30,000 per year, by working part-time for 20 hours per week at \$30/hour. She also pays \$6,000 in taxes and hence nets out \$24,000. She has a good wage rate per hour, but she prefers working less and earning less to enjoy other, non-work activities.

- Individual A is most deserving of the \$1,000 tax break
- Individual B is most deserving of the \$1,000 tax break
- Both individuals are exactly equally deserving of the \$1,000 tax break
- 43% consider hardworking (A) more deserving
- 3% consider easy going (B) more deserving
- 54% consider hours of work conditional on total earnings irrelevant

• Consumption vs taxes paid

Consider two families A and B. Family A earns \$50,000 and pays \$15,000 in taxes, netting \$35,000. Family B earns \$40,000 and pays \$5,000 in taxes, netting \$35,000. Which one is more deserving?

• Answers

- 55% consider (A) more deserving, as paying more in taxes
- 8% consider (B) more deserving
- 37% consider taxes paid conditional on net income irrelevant

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